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Falcon and Parker: Merger of Law and Equity in Florida--Problems and Proposals

NOTES
MERGER OF LAW AND EQUITY IN FLORIDA - PROBLEMS
AND PROPOSALS
The procedural distinctions between suits in equity and actions at law
were erased on January 1, 1967, by the 1967 revision of the 1954 Florida Rules
of Civil Procedure. 1 Most of the reasons that favor the merged procedural
system under which Florida now operates are grounded on considerations
of trial convenience. The old common law requirement that pleading establish a single issue of fact or law to be adjudicated for any given action
had already been abrogated by the 1954 Rules, which allowed parties to join
in one action as many claims or causes of action as they had against the adverse party. 2 This liberal joinder provision was subject to the trial court's
power to separate issues if convenience or protection from prejudice demanded. 3 Thus, convenience and avoidance of prejudice were the criteria
used to determine the feasibility of adjudication of all issues in a single action.
There was one substantial limitation on this rule of convenience - the concurrent existence of separate common law and equity dockets made joinder
of legal and equitable claims impossible in one action. 4 Removal of this final
impediment to free joinder culminated in a progression of pleading simplification begun by the Florida Supreme Court in the 1954 Rules. The merged
system should enable all issues between identical parties to be resolved in
one trial, subject solely to the rule of convenience.
Various problems that are unique to a merged procedure system are
expected to arise. It is the purpose of this note to anticipate several of these
problems and to propose possible solutions. The topics to be discussed, although not exhaustive of the problems that may occur, will include pleading,
joinder of causes of action and claims, permissive joinder of plaintiffs, res
judicata, right to jury trial, and scope of appellate review.

action.'" FLA. R. CIV. P.
1. "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil
1.040. Several other changes in the 1954 Rules were necessary to accomplish the merger
of the two types of action. Provisions for separate dockets and for transfer between
the two dockets in rules 1.2 and 1.39 of the 1954 Rules were omitted. The wording of rule
1.110(g), "Joinder of Causes of Action; Consistency," was altered to allow legal and equitable defenses and claims to be stated in the same action. Sections II and III of the 1954
Rules, designated "Actions at Law Only," and "Suits in Equity Only," were consolidated.
Former rule 3.2, "Joint and Several Demands," found in Section III, was deleted, as was
rule 3.7 of that section, "Joinder of Causes of Action."
2. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.8 (g), 178 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1965).
3. FrA. R. Civ. P. 1.20 (b), 178 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1965).
4. Rule 1.8 (g) of the 1954 Rules did allow defenses and counterclaims of a mixed
equitable and legal nature to be asserted in the same action. Prior to merger, however,
this permissive provision was strictly construed. See Filaretou v. Christou, 133 So. 2d
652 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961), where in an action at law the court refused to allow the defendant
to prove his equitable "defenses" because they were in effect requests for affirmative equitable relief.
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Successful pleading of the new "civil action" will depend on the parties'
full appreciation of merger's effect on each phase of the litigation process.
The plaintiff may now, in the same civil action, request and receive either
equitable or legal relief, or both. 5 When the facts support only one reasonable
theory of recovery, when the relief requested is appropriate to that theory,
and when the proof at trial is sufficient to sustain the allegations, the defendant and court are fully informed of all possible ramifications of the
complaint. In that situation, neither party is confronted in a newly merged
jurisdiction with any major procedural changes. Neither has gained nor lost
any advantage as a result of merger. Ramifications of the merged system
become apparent, however, when one set of alleged facts gives rise to one or
more formerly equitable and one or more formerly legal remedies, or when the
demand for judgment is inconsistent with the facts, either as alleged or as
proved at trial. When one of these conditions exists, merger may largely
determine the scope of the pleadings and their treatment by the court.
Transition to a merged procedural system raises several questions at the
pleading stage. How does merger affect the substance of the complaint? What
type of relief will the court award upon proof of allegations supporting both
legal and equitable theories of relief? What part is played in the complaint
by the demand for relief? What is the effect of requesting relief that is unsupported by proof at trial? Vill there be any change in dismissal of the
cause? Some answers to these and other questions are suggested below.
Pleading Under the Floridaand FederalRules
The philosophy of pleading and the purpose a complaint serves in the
litigation process within each jurisdiction will largely determine the effectiveness of merger in erasing procedural distinctions between the two formerly
distinct actions. 6 Professor Pomeroy felt that the distinction between actions
at law and suits in equity was exhibited most markedly in stating the cause
of action and in obtaining relief thereon: "[I]t is in this feature, therefore,
that the change must be the most sweeping and radical, if the distinction

5. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110 (g). Dictum in a Florida appellate decision rendered prior to the
effective date of merger indicated that joinder of legal and equitable claims was permitted
at that time: "Such claims or defenses [available to the pleader in the same right] may be
alleged in the alternative regardless of consistency, and whether based on legal or equitable
grounds, or both. Hines v. Trager Constr. Co., 188 So. 2d 826, 830 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966),
(citing rule 1.8 (g) of the 1954 Rules). The statement appears to be an erroneous or at
least a misleading assumption, for only after the revision of rule 1.8(g), now rule 1.110(g),
could causes formerly legal or equitable be joined.
6. C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING §15 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as CLARK]. See Clark,
The Union of Law and Equity, 25 COLU.IM. L. REV. 1 (1925). References to a plaintiff's
pleading may be applied equally to the pleading of a defendant that states a counterclaim
against the plaintiff, to a cross-claim or to a further pleading of the original plaintiff which
asks affirmative relief on grounds other than, or in addition to, the original allegations. FLA.
R. Civ. P1. 1.10 (g).
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has in truth been abolished." It should be remembered, however, that
while the new Florida Rules have effected a unity of procedure, they have
changed neither the "legal" nor "equitable" nature of a particular form of
relief; nor have they changed the necessary elements of the theory upon
which it is granted."
Professor Pomeroy's call for sweeping and radical changes in the statement
of the cause of action to achieve true merger was appropriate for those
jurisdictions that at an early date converted directly from common law
pleading to a merged system of pleading regulated by statute or court rules.9
There is no reason to expect such a noticeable and drastic change in Florida
pleading practice. Many of the liberalized pleading rules and procedural
practices necessary to the proper functioning of a merged court system, and
usually present in such a system, were introduced into Florida practice by the
1954 Rules and their subsequent revisions, or by earlier rules of practice.
Except for final merger of law and equity into the single action, Florida
pleading practices have approached in many ways those of the federal courts
and other merged jurisdictions since introduction of the 1954 Florida Rules.
In Florida, the pleading of a party demanding judgment must state a
"cause of action"10 and contain "a short and plain statement of the ultimate
facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."'" The Florida Supreme
Court set similar criteria for the complaint even before implementation of
the 1954 Rules. The plaintiff, stated the court, "must plead factual matter
sufficient to appraise his adversary of what he is called upon to answer so
that the court may, upon proper challenge, determine its legal effect."'' 2 In
other words, facts before the court must be sufficient to support a right to
some type of relief if they are proved as alleged. The 1965 revision of the
Florida Rules eliminated a provision that if the pleading "informs the defendant of the nature of the cause against him, it shall be held sufficient,"
because it had been interpreted as being of itself definitive of a cause of
action.' 3 This deletion would seem to indicate explicit rejection of a pure
"notice pleading" theory, in which no attempt is made to state the details
of the cause of action, and in which the plaintiff makes only a general
7. J. POMEROY, CODE R mEDS 27 (4th ed. 1904).
8. Fitzpatrick v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 1 F.R.D. 713, 715 (D.C.N.Y. 1941); cf.
J. POMEROY, CODE R MEDmEs 14 (5th ed. 1941).
9. For a compilation of all merged jurisdictions and those that allow joinder of legal
and equitable claims, see Appendices A and B to Joiner & Geddes, The Union of Law and
Equity: A Prerequisite to Procedural Revision, 55 MiCH. L. REv. 1059, 1110-11 (1957).
10. One meaning given to the term "cause of action" is that each separate remedy gives
rise to a different cause of action. See McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE
LJ. 614 (1925). The most widely accepted definition is that of Judge Clark: "[O]ne group
of operative facts gives rise to but a single cause of action upon which varying claims, both
legal and equitable, may be made." CLARK 445. Judge Clark's definition is adopted for
discussion purposes within this note, except when a contrary meaning is indicated. For exten'sive periodical references discussing "cause of action," see 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
359 n.26 (2d ed. 1965) and CLARK 127-48 nn.135-96.
11. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b).
12. Messana v. Maule Indus., 50 So. 2d 874, 876 (Fla. 1951).
13. See Kislak v. Kreedian, 95 So. 2d 510, 513-14 (Fla. 1957).
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reference to the occurrence out of which the case arose. 14 Florida courts have,
however, recognized the necessity of pleading matter other than "ultimate
facts" and have noted that the pleading is often a mixture of conclusions of
law and factual matter of varying specificity. 15
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only a "short and plain
statement of the claim."'- Federal court decisions have interpreted this more
lenient federal rule as denoting the "aggregate of operative facts which give
rise to a right enforceable in the courts."',- Both jurisdictions apparently aim
toward providing a minimum of "fair notice" both to the court and to the
defendant.' 8 "Fair notice" is considered to be a combination of facts or conclusions of law sufficient to place each party and the court on notice of the
matters that are in dispute. Because it is a relative standard, the particularity
of allegation will vary according to the issue of the case.' 9 Beyond the facts
necessary to give the defendant a fair opportunity to prepare a defense,
nothing is required. For although the allegations must be stated with a
definite rule of law in mind, no legal theory need be explicit in the complaint
20
itself.
The "theory of the pleadings" doctrine requires the plaintiff to select a
theory of action in his complaint. 21 He is then restricted throughout the litigation to that initial choice, and his case is lost if the theory is not supported
by evidence introduced at trial. 22 Fortunately, the doctrine has been rejected
in Florida as well as in federal courts. 23

In neither jurisdiction does success

of the action depend upon the correctness of the plaintiff's initial choice of
a rule of law. Discretion is allowed the court to award the relief warranted
by proof at trial. The rules of both jurisdictions provide for liberal amendment of the pleadings to conform with such relief.24 This tolerance may lead
to a disparity between the theory and relief initially contemplated and the
relief finally awarded or denied. As long as a shift in theories is not too
drastic, it should be allowed- particularly in a merged jurisdiction.25
Florida's rejection of the less flexible theory-of-the-pleadings doctrine has
become particularly significant with the advent of merger. Heretofore in
14. See generally CLARK 240-41.
15. Williams v. Guyton, 167 So. 2d 7, 9 (3d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 168 So. 2d 751
(Fla. 1964); Luckie v. McCall Mfg. Co., 153 So. 2d 311 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (a).
17. Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1943).

18. CLARK 126, 232. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) ("fair notice" of
plaintiff's claim and grounds upon which it rests are required); Chasin v. Richey, 91 So.
2d 811 (Fla. 1957) (defendant must be placed on proper notice by allegations in body of
complaint).
19.

CLARK 232.

20. O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 338 U.S. 384 (1949); accord, Doss Oil Royalty Co.
v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 364, 137 P.2d 934, 939 (1943).
21. CLARK 259-65.
22. Walrath v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 126 N.Y. 220, 110 N.E. 426 (1915).
23. Nord v. McIroy, 296 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1961); Neter v. Western Union Tel. Co., 25
F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1938); Davis v. Stow, 60 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1952). See generally Alberts-

worth, The Theory of the Pleadings in Code States, 10
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 15 (b); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190 (b).
25. CLARK 265. See text accompanying note 55 infra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol20/iss2/3

CALIF.

L. RFV. 202 (1922).

4

1967]

Falcon and Parker: Merger of Law and Equity in Florida--Problems and Proposals
MERGER OF LAW AND EQUITY IN FLORIDA

Florida, award of the relief warranted by the allegations and proof at trial
was applied only to homogeneous actions (those raised on only one "side" of
the court) except where equity retained jurisdiction to award damages incidental to, or in lieu of, equitable relief. 26 The plaintiff's relief in an action at
law was restricted to damages based upon one of the various common law
forms of action. In a suit properly in equity, relief was restricted to remedies
historically of an equitable nature. Merger permits one court to award the
relief to which the plaintiff is entitled, regardless of its historically legal or
equitable nature. In order to avoid an unexpected form of judgment, both
plaintiff and defendant should be cognizant of this greater latitude given
the court to award the appropriate relief.
Courts in merged jurisdictions are now reluctant to dismiss an action because the pleader has incorrectly labeled his claim or chosen an inappropriate
remedy. They have held that the plaintiff's recovery does not stand or fall on
his initially adopted theory if relief on any rule of law is warranted. 27 Even
before merger in Florida, the complaint was not dismissed for an insufficient
cause of action if its allegations could support a claim for any relief, legal
or equitable. 28 In such a situation, the case was amenable to a motion to
transfer the action to the other side of the court. 29 Thus, merger has not enlarged the plaintiff's right to remain in court when the complaint is tested
by a motion to dismiss. It has only saved him the trouble and expense of
transferring his case to the "other side."
The general characteristics of Florida pleading, discussed above, indicate
that Florida is now in a position similar to the federal courts in 1938 after
introduction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Florida should profit
from the experience of the federal courts, which have operated for thirty
years under rules similar to those now in effect in Florida. Parties faced with
procedural questions brought about by merger can look to the federal courts
for guidance, for the Florida judiciary has indicated its receptiveness to
federal pleading practices. Interpretation by federal tribunals of federal rules
after which Florida rules have been patterned has been described by Florida
courts as "persuasive" or "pertinent" in interpreting similar Florida provisions.30 Treatment of pleadings similar to that of the federal courts, therefore,
can logically be anticipated under the merged Florida procedure. Hopefully,
26. E.g., Norris v. Eikenberry, 103 Fla. 104, 137 So. 128 (1931).
27.

"Since the enactment of the Code ...

the question ...

is not whether the plaintiff

has a legal or an equitable right, or the defendant a legal or equitable defense against the
plaintiff's claim; but whether, according to the whole law of the land, applicable to the
case, the plaintiff makes out the right which he seeks to establish or the defendant shows
that the plaintiff ought not to have the relief sought for." Crary v. Goodman, 12 N.Y. 266,
268 (1855). But for an example of strict application of the theory-of-the-pleadings doctrine,
see Supervisors of Kewaunee County v. Decker, 30 Wis. 624, 633 (1872).
28. Hanklins v. Title & Trust Co., 169 So. 2d 526 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964). When the
plaintiff has requested equitable relief but his allegations failed on their face to raise an
equitable claim, Oklahoma courts have treated the claim as one of damages and denied
a motion to dismiss, even though no specific sum was requested. Fraley v. Wilkinson, 79
Okla. 21, 23, 191 P. 156, 158 (1920); Schelling v. Moore, 34 Okla. 155, 125 P. 487 (1920).
29. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.39, 178 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1965) (deleted in 1967 revision).
30. See Savage v. Rowell Distrib. Corp., 95 So. 2d 415, 417 (Fla. 1957).
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reference to federal experience will enable the Florida judiciary and bar to
avoid pitfalls into which the federal courts have fallen from time to time.
It is unlikely that merger in Florida will evoke the adverse criticism that
has occasionally accompanied procedural change in other jurisdictions. Early
criticism of the federal pleading rules appeared to be partially founded upon
fear that such rules would place the defendant at great disadvantage. It was
thought that his inability to know which theory would be argued by the plaintiff at trial or which theory of relief would be accepted by the court might
hamper the preparation and presentation of his defense. Judging by the
success of federal pleading practices, 31 however, there appears to be little substance to these objections. On the contrary, the pretrial discovery devices of
the Federal Rules permit the defendant to uncover many concealed facts and
issues. 32 Additional safeguards have been imposed in individual cases, such
as one court's refusal to grant relief when the defendant had no opportunity
to present certain equitable considerations in his defense. 33 Florida courts
have similarly protected the defendant. They have indicated that the practice
of permitting a plaintiff to amend his pleadings and of awarding relief on
measure ala theory other than that initiated by the plaintiff is a corrective
34
lowable only when it does not unduly prejudice the defendant.
Choice of Relief
Both Florida and Federal Rules require that the complaint contain "a
demand for judgment for the relief to which he [the plaintiff] deems himself
entitled." 35 Although the demand for relief is a necessary component of the
complaint,36 in neither jurisdiction is it considered an integral part of the
statement of the cause of action or ultimately determinative of the nature of
the relief that will be granted.37 In Florida, the facts alleged and proved,
rather than the form of relief requested, determine the nature of the judgment
awarded. 38 A few cases in both jurisdictions have held that where the
plaintiff's theory is in doubt, the form of relief demanded may be examined
2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 457 (2d ed. 1965).
Clark & Wright, The Judicial Council and the Rule-Making Power: A Dissent and
a Protest, 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 346, 353 (1950).
33. United States v. An Article of Drug Consisting of 47 Bottles, 320 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.
1963).
34. Tucker v. Daugherty, 122 So. 2d 230 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (a); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110 (b).
36. Id. See Oklahoma Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 265 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1953), in which the
prayer for relief was said to be a necessary part of the petition but not part of the cause
of action.
37. Cohen v. Randell, 137 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1943); Southern Pine Extract Co. v. Bailey,
75 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1954). Cf. Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1959), where the
trial court's striking a portion of the prayer for relief in an attempt to dismiss some of the
plaintiff's legal theories, was said to be a futile and meaningless gesture; the trial judge
at the close of the case was still obligated to grant to the parties the relief proved to be
warranted.
38. Phelps v. Higgins, 120 So. 2d 633 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960); Chasin v. Richey, 91 So.
2d 811 (Fla. 1957).
31.
32.
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to determine the theoretical framework of the allegations. 39 This practice,
though, has been criticized as a reversion to the theory-of-the-pleadings
doctrine.40 Despite such criticism, it seems unrealistic to assume a court that
has studied a complaint to determine its sufficiency could ignore the inferences raised by the nature of relief sought. Where both legal and equitable,
theories of relief are raised by the allegations, the demand should notify
the court and defendant of the theory and relief initially preferred by the
plaintiff.-' However, as mentioned above, he normally would not be limited
to his initial choice of theory or form of relief.
The liberal amendment provisions of both the Federal and Florida Rules
allow plaintiff to amend his demand for judgment and to conform it to the
relief found warranted at trial. 42 Such amendments, .however, are usually
not essential to the granting of the appropriate relief. 43 It is doubtful that
Florida courts will tolerate a completely nonspecific demand for relief, such
as a request "for any relief, equitable or legal, which the court finds warranted by the proof at trial."'4 4 Under merger, the specific form of legal and
equitable relief preferred should be requested, although it may be cumulative or stated in the alternative. An overly generalized claim for relief is
made unnecessary by Florida Rule 1.110 (b), which provides that "every
complaint shall be considered to pray for general relief." This provision is
similar to the federal provision that "every final judgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if
the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." 45 In some cases,
"particular legal theories of counsel" have yielded to "the court's duty to
grant the relief to which the prevailing party is entitled, whether demanded
or not." 46 This seemingly blanket discretion of the trial judge does have
limits in both jurisdictions: relief that neither party desires ordinarily will
not be forced upon him; 47 relief will not be granted if the grounds for that
39. E.g., Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773, 784 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (relative to plaintiff's
right to a jury trial); Ellison v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 175 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1965).
40. 6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1209 (2d ed. 1965).
41. In Everit v. Walworth County Bank, 13 Wis. 468 (1861), the court noted that the
nature of action could be determined by the prayer for relief in cases of doubt and uncertainty.
42. FED. R. Cirv. P. 15 (b); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190 (b).
43. Cohen v. Randell, 137 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1943); Shirley v. Lake Butler Corp., 123 So.
2d 267 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
44. Inadequate specificity in the demand for judgment is illustrated by the following
demands in an equity action, which were considered to be "improper" by the court: "ifihe
amended complaint, which concludes with a prayer that the court 'construe the sworn
allegations herein, the exhibits attached, and the testimony presented, and ascertain to
what extent the defendant has committed unfair labor practices . . . . That if unfair
labor practices have been committed, and are being committed . . . a permanent injunction be entered . . . and that plaintiffs have damages . . . and that the court allow such
other relief as in equity may be just." Hotel & Restaurant Employee Union v. Boca Raton
Club, Inc., 73 So. 2d 867, 869 (Fla. 1954).
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 54 (c). The relief awarded may differ greatly from that requested in
the petition. Owens v. Purdy, 90 Okla. 256, 217 P. 425 (1923) (rescission of contract granted
when plaintiff desired enforcement).
46. Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d 974, 976 (2d Cir. 1945).
47. Mercury Oil & Ref. Co. v. Oil Workers Union, 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951); Daniel
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relief have not been substantiated by proof.4 8 These limits should prevent
either party from being prejudiced by a surprise award of legal relief when
equitable relief was expected, or vice versa.
Examples from other merged jurisdictions illustrate the treatment that
may be expected in Florida. When the plaintiff, demanding a judgment
stemming from a solely equitable cause of action, fails to prove grounds for
equitable relief but does establish a case for legal relief, it has been held
that he should recover the legal judgment. 49 New York courts have held that
if legal relief alone is requested and the party's allegations and proof entitle
him solely to equitable relief, the court should disregard his demand for
judgment, rely on the facts alleged and proved, and grant equitable relief.3°
If the plaintiff thought he had a right to both legal and equitable relief and
pleaded the necessary facts, praying for both remedies but failing to establish
his equitable cause of action at trial, he should still recover the legal judgment.5 1 Finally, a situation may arise in which the factual allegations entitle
the plaintiff solely to equitable relief; equitable relief alone is demanded,
and proof at trial fails to establish the facts alleged but does establish a legal
cause of action entitling the plaintiff to legal relief. On the principle that
"the court looks to the facts alleged and proved, and not to the prayer for
relief," Professor Pomeroy proposes that the suit must be dismissed because
the specific allegations in the complaint were not proved. 52 This principle is
recognized in Florida, 53 but Florida's liberal amendment policies allow a
more just result. If the defendant has had a fair opportunity to rebut the
facts introduced at trial, whether or not contained in the original complaint,
the court could (and should) allow the plaintiff to amend the allegations and
54
award the relief warranted by the proved facts.
Pleadings- Summary
The prevailing view denies that the defendant is entitled in every case
to advance notice of a single legal theory upon which the plaintiff is required to rely. Courts today prefer to protect a party's substantive right to
recover upon any rule of law properly found applicable to the established
facts, rather than to protect his adversary from possible, but often fanciful,
v. Daniel, 171 So. 2d 180 (2d D.C.A, Fla. 1965).
48. Carter v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 152 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
49. Truth Seeker Co. v. Durning, 147 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1945); Pasley v. De Weese, 183
Okla. 424, 82 P.2d 1066 (1938).
50. Emery v. Pease, 20 N.Y. 62, 64 (1859); accord, Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th
Cir. 1952); Perkins v. Remillard, 84 F. Supp. 224 (D. Mass. 1949).
51. Sternberger v. McGovern, 56 N.Y. 12, 21 (1874) (specific performance and damages).
52. J. PoM EROY, CODE REMEDIES 39 (4th ed. 1904).
53. Phelps v. Higgins, 120 So. 2d 633 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
54. E.g., Shores v. Murphy, 88 So. 2d 294, 296 (Fla. 1956); Dworkis v. Dworkis, III
So. 2d 70 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959). Liberal pleading and amendment practices such as those
in effect in Florida should allow a plaintiff to avoid the harsh results of a decision such
as Stafford v. McDougal, 171 Okla. 106, 42 P.2d 520 (1935), in which plaintiff's request for
rescission of a contract was not substantiated, yet the plaintiff was not permitted to amend
his pleadings to request damages.
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surprise. 55 By this, the better interpretation, merger will occasionally require
the defendant to defend against both legal and equitable claims raised by
a single or multiple set of factual allegations, whether or not the plaintiff
demands more than one type of relief. The burden of added preparation,
occasioned by the exceptional case, is a small price to pay for the opportunity to conclude litigation between the parties with one, all-inclusive action.
For as Mr. Justice Black has remarked: "Pleadings are intended to serve as
a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They should not raise barriers which prevent achievement of that
end.,'56

JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION

Before merger, rule 1.8 (g) of the 1954 Florida Rules permitted claims
and statements of fact in the alternative and joinder of as many claims as
Only defenses were pleaded
the pleader had against the opposing party. 57
This rule has been modior
legal
nature.
to
their
equitable
regard
without
fied to allow pleading and joinder of defenses and claims, whether legal or
equitable.

58

The Florida rule governing joinder of causes of action is not patterned
after the federal provision. Its phraseology, however, appears to arrive at
the same result: liberal joinder of any cause of action brought by the
plaintiff "in

59

the same right."

Such latitude promoting widespread joinder

R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 194-200
(1952). See James, The Objective and Function of the Complaint, Common Law - Codes FederalRules, 14 VAND. L. REv. 899 (1961); James, The Revival of Bills of Particulars Under
the Federal Rules, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1473, 1481-85 (1958).
56. Maty v. Grasselli Chem. Co., 303 U.S. 197, 200 (1938).
57. "A pleader may set up in the same action as many claims or causes of action or
defenses in the same right as he has, and claims for relief may be stated in the alternative
if separate items make up the cause of action, or if two or more causes of action are joined.
A party may also set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively, either
in one count or defense, or in separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements
are made in the alternative and one of them, if made independently, would be sufficient,
the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative
statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has, regardless
of consistency, and whether [a defense be] based on legal or on equitable grounds, or on
both. All pleadings shall be construed so as to do substantial justice." FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.8(g), 178 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1965). Words in brackets were deleted by the 1967 revision.
One express exception to joinder permitted by the rule is found in FLA. STAT. §46.08
(1965), which prohibits joining actions of replevin and ejectment with each other or
with other causes of action.
58. FLA. R. Cv. P. 1.110(g).
59. Pertinent provisions of the Federal Rules are as follows: "A party may also state
as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on
legal or on equitable grounds or on both." FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (e) (2). "The plaintiff in his
complaint or in a reply setting forth a counterclaim and the defendant in an answer setting
55.

forth a counterclaim may join either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims

either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party. There may be
a like joinder of claims when there are multiple parties if the requirements of Rules 19, 20,
and 22 are satisfied. There may be a like joinder of cross-claims or third-party claims if
the requirements of Rules 13 and 14 respectively are satisfied." FED. R. Cxv. P. 18 (a). The
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of actions, whatever their former equitable or legal nature, should permit
Florida to reap the full benefits of merger, at least in actions involving only
one plaintiff and defendant.
Many of the early merger statutes limited the causes that could be joined
to those arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions.60 This limitation was aimed at preventing litigation of diverse issues
in a single suit, which might cause undue confusion and complexity during
trial- particularly a jury trial.61 The latitude of the federal provision suggests that the convenience and utility of resolving all differences between
parties simultaneously has come to outweigh vague fears of confusion and
complexity. Many states have found the earlier, more restrictive provisions
inadequate and have adopted a rule identical with or similar to the federal
rule.62 The problem is now considered one of trial convenience and practi-

cality rather than a problem of pleading. Difficulties resulting from joinder
of too many diverse causes can be judged accurately only at trial.63 There is
no real need to restrict joinder of claims at the pleading stage, for once the
causes are set for trial, the court is authorized to grant separate trials if the
issues are too complex or if one party may be unduly prejudiced by a single
trial.64
Experience in federal courts illustrates the success of the liberal joinderof-claims provision in allowing legal and equitable causes to be tried together.
Equitable claims for injunction and restitution have been joined as both
independent and alternate claims.6 s A plaintiff has been allowed to sue for
reformation or rescission of a contract in the same action in which he sues
for damages on the contract.6 6 A plaintiff has pursued in the same suit legal
claims for conversion and for money had and received, and equitable claims
for the declaration of a constructive trust and for an accounting.67 Decisions
Florida provision that the pleader must be affected "in the same right" places a general
restriction upon joinder of causes of action. The plaintiff must be affected in the same
capacity in the sense that a cause affecting one as an individual, for example, cannot be
joined with another that affects him only as an administrator. FLA. R. Civ. P. l.ll0(g).
60. Such a provision first appeared in the New York Civil Practice Act §258, N.Y. Laws
ch. 392, §167. These classes have usually numbered from six to ten, and have included:
(I) express or implied contracts; (2) injuries to the person; (3) injuries to character; (4)
injuries to property; (5) actions to recover real property with or without damages; (6) actions
to recover chattels with or without damages; (7) claims against a trustee by virtue of a
contract or operation of law; and (8) actions arising out of the same transaction or
transactions connected with the same subject of action. CLARK 441.
61.

CLARK 434.

62. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a). These states are listed in CLARK 443.
63. Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading Rules, 36 MINN.
L. REV. 580 (1952). See Joiner, Michigan Procedural Revision: A Partial Set of Rules, 38
MICH. S.B.J., Jan. 1959, p. 10.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.270(b). For a general background on
joinder of causes of action under common law, equity, and the codes, see Blume, A Rational
Theory for Joinder of Causes of Action and Defenses, and for the Use of Counterclaims, 26
MicH. L. REv. 1 (1927).
65. United States v. Ziomek, 191 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1951).
66. Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1956); Venn-Severin Mach. Co. v. John Kiss Sons
Textile Mills, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 4 (D.N.J. 1941).
67. Palmer v. Palmer, 31 F. Supp. 861 (D. Conn. 1940).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol20/iss2/3

10

1967)

Falcon and Parker: Merger of Law and Equity in Florida--Problems and Proposals
MERGER OF LAW AND EQUITY IN FLORIDA

in states with a merged system having joinder provisions similar to the federal
rule have granted similar freedom to plead both legal and equitable causes
in the same complaint.6s
Professor Wright has advised: "[I]f there is any reason why bringing in
another party or another claim might get matters settled faster, or cheaper,
or more justly, then join them."69 Although the Florida rule governing
joinder of causes of action in itself will permit extensive joinder of legal and
equitable causes, some restriction may be encountered when an attempt is
made to join the claims of more than one plaintiff. Presumably, the joinderof-causes-of-action provision applies to litigation involving both single and
multiple parties. Its usefulness in encouraging joinder under the merged
system may be curtailed, however, by Florida's somewhat restrictive rule
governing permissive joinder of plaintiffs.
PERMIssIVE JOINDER OF PLAINTIFFS

Rule 1.210 (a) of the Florida Rules provides for permissive joinder of
plaintiffs: "All persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in
obtaining the relief demanded may join as plaintiffs." New York and English
experience with such permissive joinder provisions indicates an inseparable
relationship between rules controlling joinder of parties and those regulating
joinder of causes of action. If the joinder-of-plaintiffs rule is the more restrictive of the two rules, it often sets the limit for joinder of causes of
action. 70 Other jurisdictions have found that wording similar to that used
in the Florida provision has overly restricted joinder of plaintiffs and causes
of action. The Florida rule lists two separate requirements that must be met
before plaintiffs may be joined: each plaintiff must have an interest "in the
subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded."
The present rule copies the phraseology of Florida's former equity practice. 71 This provision was first used in New York's original Field Code and
was in keeping With the drafters' intention to apply equity procedures to all
68. Crabtree v. Standard Say. & Loan Ass'n, 187 Okla. 189, 102 P.2d 127 (1940) (suit

for specific performance and in the alternative for damages). Early Missouri decisions
showed a reluctance typical of states soon after merger to allow plaintiffs to join claims
for both legal and equitable relief. See Curd v. Lackland, 43 Mo. 139 (1868) in which
plaintiff was not allowed to unite an equitable claim for cancellation or reformation of a
deed with a legal claim for possession. Cf. Gott v. Powell, 41 Mo. 416 (1867). Later cases
revealed the courts' acceptance of joining legal and equitable claims. In Martin v. Turnbaugh, 153 Mo. 172, 54 S.W. 515 (1899), the court noted that: "[T]he petition may now

have a count at law and a count in equity .. .the answer may contain a legal defense,
an equitable defense, and an equitable cross bill or counterclaim . . .and the reply may
set up legal or equitable defenses to the new matter set up in the answer . . . . The

object of all which [sic] is to simplify proceedings, and to settle the whole controversy between the parties in the one action." Id. at 186, 54 S.W. at 517.
69. Wright, supra note 63, at 632.
70. See McBaine, Recent Pleading Reforms in California, 16 CALF. L. REv. 363, 381
(1928); Toelle, joinder of Actions -With Special Reference to Montana and California
Practice, 18 CALIF. L. REv. 459, 470 (1930).
71. Florida Equity Rule 8, Fla. Laws 1931, ch. 14,658, §8.
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actions under the Code. 72 Since its first adoption in the Field Code, the provision has appeared at one time or another in the code or court rules of more
than twenty states. 73 In New York it was soon recognized that the dual requirements, when strictly interpreted, would occasionally be a stumbling
block to plaintiffs. Some courts even required that all plaintiffs have an
interest in the whole subject of the action and in all relief demanded.74 After
several intermediate amendments to the 1848 provision, each proving some75
what inadequate, New York adopted the full federal reform in 1949.
Courts in Missouri have dismissed contract actions under an identical
provision because all plaintiffs "were not interested in the relief demanded,"
when multiple obligees with separate interests sued their common obligor,76
and when obligees under separate contracts sued the same obligor. 7 7 A history
of the Missouri Rules s points out that the court's confusion resulted from
failure to apply the phrase "an interest in" equally to both clauses, "subject
of the action" and "relief demanded." Under Missouri's unfortunate interpretation, each plaintiff would have to be entitled to relief identical with
that requested by every other plaintiff. Pomeroy noted, however, that neither
extent nor source of the "interest" was significant as long as the two requirements were satisfied. 79 In 1943, Missouri adopted what is in substance
the federal rule discussed below. °
California's experience with a Florida-type provision, from 1872 until
substitution of a different rule in 1927,81 prompted a change in the provision's
wording from "and" to "or," thereby placing the requirements in the alternative. Numerous legislative measures specifically abolishing restrictive
2
judicial interpretations of the former provision were also enacted.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1956 also placed the joinder require72. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1848, ch. 379, §97.
73. These states are listed in Wheaton, A Study of the Statutes Which Contain the
Term "Subject of the Action," 18 CORNELL L. Q. 20, 25 n.31 (1932).
74. Clark & Wright, The Judicial Council and the Rule-M1faking Power: A Dissent and
a Protest, I SYRACUSE L. REV. 346 (1950). See Gray v. Rothschild, 48 Hun 596, 1 N.Y. Supp.
299 (Sup. Ct. 1888), afJ'd, 112 N.Y. 668, 19 N.E. 847 (1889) (claims by multiple plaintiffs
for money damages dismissed). For a discussion of the significance of the term "subject
of action" see Wheaton, A Study of the Statutes Which Contain the Term "Subject of the
Action (pts. 1-2)," 18 CORNELL L.Q. 20, 232 (1932-1933).
75. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §212 (McKinney 1963).
76. Keary v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 30 F. Supp. 359 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1887),
error dismissed, 136 U.S. 359 (1890).
77. Ballew Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 288 Mo. 473, 232 S.W. 1015

(1921).
78. Wheaton, History of Civil Procedure in Missouri, 29 Mo. ANN.
79. J.

POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES

STAT.

1, 6 (1949).

166 (4th ed. 1904).

80. 29 Mo. ANN. STAT. §507.040 (1949).
81. See, e.g., Daly v. Ruddell, 137 Cal. 671, 70 P. 784 (1902); Gceurkink v. Petaluma, 112
Cal. 306, 44 P. 570 (1896) (where abutting landowners whose respective lots would be
similarly damaged by a threatened change of watercourse were allowed to join suits to
restrain the change but not to recover damages).
82. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §378 (Deering 1959). See Yankwich, Joinder of Parties in the
Light of Recent Statutory Changes, 2 So. CAL. L. REV. 315 (1929), to the effect that the
object of the 1927 amendment was to avoid the double requirement by providing two
classes of persons eligible to join as plaintiffs, as specified in the amended rule.
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ments in the alternative by substituting "or" for "and," but it did not add
the liberalizing provisions found in the 1927 California amendment.8 3 The
Judicial Council of Wisconsin indicated that the change was to allow joinder
of plaintiffs with different interests in the subject of the action and to permit
them to ask for the same or different types of relief.8 4 The change was also
intended to permit joinder of plaintiffs who were commonly interested in the
same relief, even though there was no common interest in the subject of the
action.8 5
The successive repudiation of the provision by New York, Missouri, California, Wisconsin, and other states- indicates a growing recognition of the
clause's shortcomings. As shown above, it has produced results contrary to
the liberal pleading rules' objective to join plaintiffs whenever the subject
matter of the action can be conveniently and fairly litigated in one trial. A
rule unduly limiting joinder of plaintiffs may prevent full use of Florida's
provision for free joinder of causes of action. Serious consideration, therefore,
should be given to replacing rule 1.210 (a) with one more in keeping with the
objectives of merger. The present Florida provision dictates to rather than
guides the court.8 7 It can automatically preclude joinder of plaintiffs who
have more than one question of law or fact arising out of circumstances
sufficiently related to justify a single trial. Several plaintiffs, some requesting
legal relief and others equitable relief, frequently want to bring a suit based
on allegations arising from a common occurrence or event. Under a strict
interpretation of the joinder provision, a single suit would be impossible
because of the plaintiffs' inability to qualify as having a common "interest in
the relief demanded." The broad provision for joinder of causes of action
is thereby rendered ineffective.
This restrictive effect has motivated over one-third of the states 8 to reject
such provisions and to adopt more liberal ones that essentially require only
that the case present a common question of law or fact affecting all parties.
Consider the provision in the Federal Rules:89
Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact
common to all of them will arise in the action .... A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all
the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the
plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief ....
Such a rule would be broad enough to permit joinder of plaintiffs com83.
84.
85.

Court Rules, 271 Wis. v, vi (1956) (§260.10).
Wis. STAT. ANN. §260.10 (1957) (interpretive commentary).
Id.

86. For a listing of states that have enacted new provisions liberalizing joinder of

causes of actions and parties, see 1955 Wis. L. Rav. 458, 471 n.72.
87. CL.RK §58, at 369.
88.
89.

CLARK §58.
FED. R. Crv. P. 20 (a) (emphasis added).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

13

Florida
Review,LAW
Vol. REVIEW
20, Iss. 2
UNIVERSITY
OFLaw
FLORIDA

[1967], Art. 3

[Vol XX

mensurate with the present provision for joinder of causes of action in
Florida. It contains reasonable limits within which the trial judge may
exercise -his discretion to assure an unprejudiced, yet efficient, trial of issues
common to the plaintiffs. Although Florida courts apparently did not find
the present rule to be a major procedural stumbling block before merger, a
new rule similar to the Federal Rule would avoid problems experienced by
other jurisdictions and insure maximum use of the expanded joinder-ofclaims provision under merger.
RES JUDICATA

Res judicata, or former adjudication, describes the effect of prior litigation
on a subsequent proceeding: a judgment on the merits upon an issue in
controversy between parties is conclusive in any subsequent litigation upon
the same subject matter between those same parties.90 There are two aspects
of the doctrine. The first concerns the effect of a prior judgment in a subsequent trial based on the same cause of action. The second is the effect
of a judgment in a subsequent trial based on a different cause of action.
The effect of res judicata, when the same cause of action is involved, is
that if plaintiff prevails in the first suit, his cause of action is merged in his
judgment or decree and may never again be made the subject of judicial
inquiry; if he loses in the first suit, his cause of action is barred from subsequent litigation. 91 In order for the defense of bar or merger to be successful
in the subsequent action, the former judgment must have been on the
merits,92 and the defendant's pleading must clearly show that the former
93
judgment contained all elements necessary for res judicata to apply:
identity in the two suits of (a) parties, 9 4 (b) the thing sued for, 95 (c) the
90. Town of Boca Raton v. Moore, 122 Fla. 250, 165 So. 279 (1936). "'[R]es judicata' .. .
may be briefly defined as the doctrine that an existing final judgment or decree rendered
upon the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties and of their
privies, in all other actions and suits . . . on the points and matters in issue in the first
suit." United States Gypsum Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 124 Fla. 633, 636, 169 So. 532, 534
(1936).
91. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§47, 48 (1942).
92. Armstrong v. County of Manatee, 49 Fla. 273, 37 So. 938 (1905). FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.420 states that voluntary dismissal of a suit by a party who has once dismissed an action
based on or including the same claim, or involuntary dismissal by the court, unless otherwise specified in the court's order of dismissal, operates as an adjudication on the merits.
93. Miami Beach v. Miami Beach Improvement Co., 153 Fla. 107, 14 So. 2d 172 (1943).
The pleadings must be specific enough to permit an intelligent decision, as regards res
judicata, to be made thereon, Moorhead v. Moorhead, 159 Fla. 470, 31 So. 2d 867 (1947), and
the party asserting the plea has the burden of proof. Bagwell v. Bagwell, 153 Fla. 471, 14
So. 2d 841 (1943).
94. Ford v. Dania Lumber & Supply Co., 150 Fla. 435, 7 So. 2d 594 (1942). Knowledge
of or interest in the suit is not sufficient to make one a party thereto. The party to be
estopped must have formally intervened or been served with process in the earlier suit,
Virginia-Carolina Corp. v. Smith, 121 Fla. 720, 164 So. 717 (1935). Of course, persons in
privity with the parties to a suit, who stand in mutual or successive relation to the same
right are also bound by that adjudication. King v. Duke, 129 Fla. 741, 176 So. 787 (1937).
95. State v. Dubose, 152 Fla. 304, 11 So. 2d 477 (1943).
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quality of the parties,96 and (d) the cause of action.97 The scope of bar or
merger includes not only the issues actually litigated in the former suit, but
also those that might have been litigated in sustaining or defeating the claim
asserted. 08
The second aspect of res judicata is generally known as collateral estoppel.
When the parties to the former trial are litigating a different cause of action,
issues of fact and certain issues of law actually litigated and essential to the
earlier judgment are conclusively determined and cannot be relitigated.99
There is no inequity in allowing res judicata to foreclose subsequent consideration of matters that were actually litigated in a former suit. When,
however, the doctrine is allowed to foreclose consideration of matters that
might have been litigated in the former suit, but which in fact were not, the
result might well be inequitable. 00 It is as to this aspect of the doctrine that
considerable disagreement over the wisdom of its use has arisen.' 0'
Prior to the liberalization of pleading and joinder rules and the merger
of law and equity, collateral estoppel was relatively free of unjust results.
The scope of trial was sharply limited as to the number of issues that could
be litigated in one lawsuit and, of course, combining legal and equitable
claims was prohibited. Therefore, it was reasonable to require litigants to
present all claims and defenses in one action and to disallow subsequent
litigation of omitted claims or defenses. Liberalization of procedural rules
and merger, however, permit adjudication of all legal and equitable claims
between the parties in one suit, regardless of their logical inconsistency02
The question posed by merger, then, is the extent to which courts should
allow res judicata to make compulsory that which is now merely permissible
and desirable. It is obvious that strict application of res judicata to an
expanded notion of cause of action would be an effective deterrent to litigants who wish to "hedge their bets" and rely on separate suits to enforce
their rights. Subsequent suits would be impossible, since the matter which
plaintiff would seek to have resolved would usually be one that "might have
been offered" at the earlier trial. Strict application would thus compel parties
to take advantage of the liberal joinder provisions of the code and litigate
96. Id.

97. Hay v. Salisbury, 92 Fla. 446, 109 So. 617 (1926). In this respect, the test of a cause
of action is the identity of the facts essential to maintenance of the suit, Jackson v. Bullock,
62 Fla. 507, 57 So. 355 (1911).
98. State v. Mayo, 87 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1956); Grant v. Hammond-Jones, Inc., 79 So.
2d 423 (Fla. 1955); In re Haskins' Estate, 63 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1953); Wade v. Oliver, 94
Fla. 817, 114 So. 548 (1927); Hay v. Salisbury, 92 Fla. 446, 109 So. 617 (1926); Sauls v.
Freeman, 24 Fla. 209, 4 So. 525 (1888).
99. REsrATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§68(1), 70 (1942); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1942); Note, Developments in the Law - Res Judicata, 65 HAuv.
L. Rxv. 818, 840 (1952).
100. E.g., Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 103 A.2d 9, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 835
(1954). See generally Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948).
101. Cleary, supra note 100, at 341, is one of many who doubts the wisdom or justice
of application in such a case. Contra, Wheaton, Causes of Action Blended, 22 MINN. L.
REv. 498 (1938), who favors strict application of the rule in such cases.
102. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110 (g).
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all claims and defenses arising from the same transaction in one lawsuit. The
countervailing consideration, however, is that foreclosure of a party's right
to bring suit on a meritorious claim because of earlier failure to assert that
claim, whether by negligence, inadvertence, or ignorance, seems a harsh
manner by which to enforce the liberal joinder provisions of the new code.
Examination of the historical application of res judicata prior to merger
and the purposes of the doctrine is helpful in finding an equitable compromise.
Prior to merger, the existence of separate and independent court systems
often necessitated resort to two proceedings in cases where a plaintiff was
entitled to relief from both systems. If the situation was such that the legal
and equitable remedies were alternatives, a second trial was possible if
plaintiff's first choice of remedies was denied him for a reason that did not
preclude the alternative remedy. In such cases, a judgment or decree in
the first trial did not necessarily constitute a bar or merger. If plaintiff first
sued in equity and lost, res judicata did not bar a subsequent action at law.
Neither bar nor merger applied because the causes of action were not identical. By the application of collateral estoppel, however, matters actually litigated in, and essential to, the decree of the former equitable suit were not
open to relitigation.103

In the typical premerger situation, plaintiff first sought an equity decree
and then judgment in an action at law. It was possible for a court of equity,
once having obtained jurisdiction to try the equitable issues, to dispose also
of any legal issues in order to avoid multiplicity of trials. This exercise of
jurisdiction over legal issues has been termed the "clean-up" doctrine. 0 4
However, the chancellor, at his discretion, could deny plaintiff's request to
have the court consider the legal issues,105 and the option initially lay with
the plaintiff whether he would seek "clean-up." Neither the chancellor nor
the defendant could force disposition of the legal portion of the case in
equity, and plaintiff's failure to move for resolution of the entire case in
equity was not penalized by subsequently barring litigation of the legal issues
in a court of law.106

If plaintiff's suit in equity was unsuccessful, the decree had to be on the
merits of the dispute in order to sustain a subsequent plea of res judicata.
Dismissal of the suit for lack of equitable jurisdiction, because plaintiff had
an adequate remedy at law, because of plaintiff's "unclean hands," or because
of laches, was not deemed a final adjudication for res judicata purposes, and
103.

RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS

104.

C.

LANGDELL,

68-69, 71-72 (1942).

A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION 67 (2d ed. 1908);

J.

POMEROY,

EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§181, 231 (5th ed. 1941). The term "clean-up" is taken from
Levin, Equitable Clean-up and the Jury -A Suggested Orientation, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 320
(1951). "Clean-up" was often unavailable. In Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades
Council, 23 F.2d 426 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 594 (1928), for example, an injuncwas granted in an antitrust suit but treble damages were refused because of the necessity
of a jury trial to settle the issue of treble damages.
105. E.g., Marks v. Gates, 154 F. 481 (9th Cir. 1907); Prince v. Lamb, 128 Cal. 120, 60
P. 689 (1900); Dunlap v. Wever, 209 Iowa 590, 228 N.W. 562 (1930); Ludlum v. Buckingham,

39 N.J. Eq. 563, 2 A. 265 (Ct. Err. & App. 1885).
106. See generally Levin, supra note 104.
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a subsequent suit was not barred.' 0 If a decree unfavorable to the plaintiff
was on the merits, a subsequent legal action was not barred, but if issues
litigated in the equitable suit were pivotal to the legal action, it would be
unsuccessful by application of collateral estoppel. For example, if a decree
denying specific performance of a contract held the contract to be void, a
subsequent legal action for damages for breach of that contract would be
futile. 08
If the plaintiff was successful in equity and his cause of action warranted
both legal and equitable relief, his cause of action was deemed not to have
been merged in his decree, and he could bring a legal action. 0 9 In such a
case, collateral estoppel would still prevent relitigation of those matters actually litigated in the equity suit which were essential to the decree." 0 If
plaintiff's equitable suit was successful and his cause of action was such that
he was entitled to either equitable or legal relief, but not both, plaintiff was
precluded from subsequent legal relief, not because of res judicata, but rather
because of the election of remedies doctrine."' When plaintiff first sought
legal relief, similar doctrines were used to determine his right to subsequently
sue in equity and the scope of the suit if allowed.12
Two separate court systems were unsatisfactory, both because of trial
inconvenience and because the existence of separate systems, each of which
lent finality to the decisions of the other, often led to injustice."3 Under
merger, every plaintiff has the opportunity to obtain full relief in one suit.
How should res judicata be applied so as to encourage resort to one trial
for settlement of all claims between the parties while avoiding unnecessary
hardship for any party?
One approach to this question would be to consider each claim, legal or
equitable, as a separate cause of action. Application of res judicata would
thus be technically impossible, and collateral estoppel would control the permissible breadth of the subsequent suit as in premerger practice. If such
an approach were taken, and plaintiff sought only equitable relief and lost,
a subsequent legal action would not be barred even if based on the same
facts. Collateral estoppel would merely limit the litigation to matters not
actually litigated in the former suit or nonessential to the decree. Adoption
of this approach, however, would be improvident, since it contradicts one of
the main purposes of merger and is inefficient in terms of court time. Since
both legal and equitable claims can be enforced in one action after merger,
Hauer v. Thum, 67 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1953).
CASES ON EQurrY 1116-26 (4th ed. 1948).
109. E.g., Chapman v. General Petroleum Corp., 152 Ore. 147, 52 P.2d 190 (1935);
Perdue v. Ward, 88 W. Va. 371, 106 S.E. 874 (1921), which were suits for legal relief
brought after the granting of an injunction.
110. In Hutchinson v. Patterson, 226 Mo. 174, 126 S.W. 403 (1910), equity adjudication
as to dispute over title to a piece of land was held to be conclusive when plaintiff later
brought a suit for ejectment.
Ill. 5 A. CORBIN, CoNmAcrs 1222-23 (1951).
112. A possible combination was the bringing of a suit for specific performance after
an earlier suit brought for damages, as in Van Buren v. Fine, 101 N.J. Eq. 373, 139 A. 486
(ch. 1927).
113. E.g., see Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191 (1932).
107.

108. W. COOK,
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the plaintiff really has but one cause of action. Failure to assert a claim and
an attempt to assert it in another suit is, therefore, splitting a cause of action;
1 4
res judicata should preclude the second proceeding.
The better solution to the question is to decide the entire controversy in
one trial. A plaintiff who is granted or denied relief - whether equitable,
legal, or both - should be barred from a subsequent suit arising from the
same cause of action. A cause of action, instead of depending upon the
nature of relief sought, should be defined as merely that set of facts necessary
to sustain the claims for relief. If a set of facts were substantially the same
in the former and subsequent suits, the latter should be barred, even if the
relief sought or the legal theory advanced in the subsequent suit were not
involved in the former. Liberal joinder provisions of the code support such
a position, for plaintiff may now join in one suit as many claims as he has
against the defendant, or may seek relief in the alternative, regardless of consistency of claims or whether they are equitable, legal, or both. 115
If the suggested rule is administered inflexibily, however, injustice may
still result. For example, assume that a plaintiff sues to enjoin a nuisance
and also seeks legal damages. If the injunction is granted and the claim for
legal damages is dismissed merely because of insufficient pleading, it would
be unjust to prevent a subsequent action for recovery of the damages. Inflexibily requiring all claims to be enforced in one suit could lead to such
a result.1" 6 Res judicata is harsh because it is one of the few procedural
rules that results in complete loss of remedy. Allowing a second trial when
the parties did not have a reasonable opportunity to litigate all the issues
in the first trial would eliminate this harsh result. Certainly the harm done
by not applying res judicata strictly would be outweighed by the injustice
of preventing a second trial. Indeed, even before merger it was often held
that a party who was under a misconception as to available remedies, and
11
thus erred unintentionally, was not barred from a subsequent proceeding. 7
Res judicata should be applied to encourage a party to litigate all claims
in a single suit. To avoid occasional injustice, however, the doctrine should
be applied with discretion and relaxed when failure to assert a claim is excusable or due to circumstances beyond the party's control and responsibility.

114. "There seems no occasion for adopting the inconvenient rule that there are separate causes of action for each claim, legal and equitable; in fact to do so would be to set
aside the well-settled rule of res judicata applied before the codes, namely, that matter
once threshed out either at law or in equity could not be again litigated in the other
tribunal. Formerly a litigant in the wrong court was not thereby prevented from going into
the other court; but there is no longer reason for that particular rule. Hence the rule
against splitting a cause of action is properly applied to prevent the litigation of legal and
equitable claims on such cause at different times." CLARK 475-76.
115. FLA. R. Clv.P. 1.110(g).
116. See Gilbert v. Boak Fish Co., 86 Minn. 365, 90 N.W. 767 (1902), in which the
court held, under facts similar to those hypothesized, that plaintiff's later suit in which he
claimed legal damages was barred, plaintiff having but one cause of action, which he
split up.
117. Harris v. Owens, 153 Fla. 310, 14 So. 2d 426 (1943).
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The right to jury trial of issues of fact should be the only procedural
distinction between law and equity in a merged system." 8 Determining when
the right is available for an historically legal action is frequently difficult.
The problem exists because of the former separation of law and equity.
Jury trials were available at law as a matter of right and were unavailable
in equity. Whatever the original reasons for this distinction and regardless
of its soundness, it is no longer open to debate. The distinction has existed
for many years and is firmly grounded in state and federal constitutions"" and
in procedural rules.120 The design of the rules is clearly to preserve the
: 2
2
constitutional right to jury trial' ' as it existed at common law.12
Prior to merger of law and equity and prior to liberal procedural rules,
there was little difficulty in complying with the constitutional mandate.
Plaintiff's choice of forum determined to a large extent whether either party
could receive a jury trial. If plaintiff brought an action at law and the cause
of action was cognizable at law, either party was entitled to jury trial. On
the other hand, a suit in equity effectively foreclosed either party's right to
jury trial. There was little chance of adjudication of legal and equitable
claims in the same action.123
The Florida Rules now permit,"4 and sometimes require,125 adjudication
of legal and equitable claims in the same action. The right to jury trial,
however, is specifically preserved,'12 and neither party is said to have waived
jury trial either by joining a legal claim with an equitable one or by asserting
a legal counterclaim.12 7 Where a single claim is asserted and a single remedy
sought, there is no difficulty in historically classifying the action as legal or
118. "I]he distinction between law and equity has no procedural significance whatever
except where the right to a jury trial has been affirmatively denied, after a timely demand,
in an action which historically would be considered as arising at 'law.'" Groome v. Steward,
142 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
119. U. S. CONsT. amend. VII; FLA. CONsT. DecI. of Rights §3.
120. FED. R. Civ. P. 38; FLA. R. Cxv. P. 1.430.
121. "The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate." FED. R. Crv. P. 38 (a). "The right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution
or by statute shall be preserved to the parties inviolate." FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.430 (a).
122. "The right of trial by jury shall bee [sic] secured to all, and remain inviolate
forever." FLA. CONsT. Decl. of Rights §3. This section is designed to preserve and
guarantee right of trial by jury in proceedings according to the usage of the common
law as it was known and practiced at the time of adoption of the constitution. Hawkins
v. Rellim Inv. Co., 92 Fla. 784, 110 So. 350 (1926).
123. But cf. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.8 (g) that, prior to merger, permitted a party to assert
either a legal or equitable defense or both regardless of the substantive quality of the
claim-in-chief.
124. FLA. R. Cxv. P. 1.110 (g).
125. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170 (a).
126. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.430 (a).
127. Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1961);
Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948); Hightower v.
Bigoney, 156 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1963).
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equitable. Such cases present no problem, even after merger. However, complex actions - now permitted by the rules - that have no precise historical
analogue do present a problem.
Statistics shed light on the potential impact of the problem. In Florida
for the year 1965 (prior to merger), the percentage of civil cases tried before
a jury was 3 8/10 per cent of the total number of civil cases. 12 8 According to
a premerger study by the American Law Institute, this percentage is closely
approximated in the thirteen federal circuits.Y-9 These figures reflect the
average number of cases in which a party is likely to demand and receive
a jury trial. The American Law Institute figures, moreover, disclose that, of
the "legal" cases tried before a jury, fifty-five per cent involved negligence
or other torts.130 Such cases are not likely to involve both legal and equitable
claims even after merger; therefore, jury trial problems in such cases are
improbable. There are no available Florida figures, similar to the American
Law Institute figures, which detail the breakdown of jury trial cases by type.
One could reasonably assume, though, that a similar situation obtains in
Florida since the jury trial-civil case ratio in both Florida and the federal
circuits is similar. Thus, nontort legal cases, representing but roughly two
per cent of the total number of civil cases, are the only ones in which the
right to jury trial is a problem. Assuming no abnormal increase of jury
trials during merger, the problem of right to jury trial will arise in only
a small number of cases. Even in these cases, the problem will not arise
unless three conditions exist: "(a) one party . . .desire[s] a trial by jury, (b)
the other party .. . [does] not, and (c) the court cannot fairly decide between them. ' ' 131 From the standpoint of case load, therefore, the right to jury
trial is not an overwhelming problem. If no jury is demanded, the case will
be docketed for trial by the court. 32 If jury trial is demanded, and there
is no opposition to the demand, the case will be tried before a jury. Even
if the demand is opposed, the legal or equitable nature of the action may be
obvious, thus clearly indicating whether the right exists.
A single claim and demand for a single remedy, when met merely by a
negative defense, presents no difficulty. Neither does joinder of several
claims or defenses, of itself, create any problem. In either case, if the claims,
remedies, and defenses are all equitable or all legal, a rational classification
of the action as historically legal or equitable is easy. Even if the claims or
defenses are part legal and part equitable, but independent in character,
no jury trial problem exists. Upon proper demand for jury trial and oppo-

128. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF FLORIDA, Eleventh Annual Report (1966).
129. A.L.I., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF FEDERAL COURTS 76 (1939), as cited in Joiner
& Geddes, note 135 infra.
130. Id.
131. CLARK 94. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.430 is instructive in this respect since failure of a
party to demand a jury trial as required, i.e., by service of demand any time after commencement of the action but not later than ten days after the last pleading directed to
an issue triable by jury as of right, is deemed to constitute a waiver of the right to jury
trial.
132. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.430.
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sition by the adverse party, the claims can be severed and separately tried. 33
The order of trial is immaterial because res judicata will not apply to the
completely independent claims and defenses. If there are issues common
to and determinative of both the legal and equitable claims, severance and
separate trial of the claims present the problem determining which trial
should take place first. The order of trial is important because the factual
determinations in the first trial will bind the second trial as to those facts
essential to the prior litigation. 34 If the trial court exercises its discretion
and orders separate proceedings, the hearing in equity first, right to jury
trial of the legal issues is rather meaningless. In spite of this, however, some
maintain that the determination of order of trial, as well as the determination
of the necessity or expediency of separate trials, should be purely discretionary with the trial judge.135 A better solution is offered by Mr. Justice Black
in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 36 where it was held that the lower
court's decision to try the equitable claim first was an abuse of discretion,
correctable by write of mandamus. The Court further held that: "[O]nly under
the most imperative circumstances . . . can the right to a jury trial of legal
' 13
Prior to
issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims."
Beacon Theatres, federal courts were in disagreement whether the trial
court's decision in scheduling order of trial was absolutely discretionary.138
It is submitted that, in light of the constitutional requirement and strong
policy supporting jury trials of legal issues, this is the only defensible solution
to the order-of-trial problem.
A more difficult situation obtains when plaintiff has only one claim but
seeks several remedies, either cumulatively or alternatively, some of which
were historically available only at law and some, only in chancery. Similar
difficulties arise when, for example, plaintiff's equitable claims are met by a
defense that raises legal issues, and separate trials are impracticable because
of the close relationship between the claim and defense.
One approach to this problem is to ascertain the "basic nature of the
action as a whole" and grant the party's demand for a jury trial if that
"basic nature" is legal. 39 This test has been severely criticized, and right133. FiA. R. Civ. P. 1.270(b): "The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claims, counterclaim, or third
party claim or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims,
third party claims, or issue." Cf. Bruckman v. Hellzer, 152 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1946); United
States v. Connoly, 3 F.R.D. 417 (D. Mont. 1943); Bercovici v. Chaplin, 56 F. Supp. 417, 3

F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
134. See discussion note 98 supra.
135. Joiner & Geddes, The Union of Law and Equity -A Prerequisite to Procedural
Revision, 55 Micu. L. REv. 1059 (1957).
136. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
137. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959).
138. Compare Tanimura v. United States, 195 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1952) and Orenstein
v. United States, 191 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1951) (in which equitable issues were ordered to be
tried first), with Bruckman v. Hellzer, 152 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1946) and Leimer v. Woods,
196 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1942) (in which the legal issues were tried first).
139. Fraser v. Geist, 1 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Pa. 1940). "The decision as to whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial as 'of right' must rest upon a prior determination as
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fully so. 1 40 It contemplates classification based on the procedural distinction

supposedly abolished by merger. Moreover, the cause of the jury trial problem - liberal code provisions for pleading, joinder, and counterclaims makes possible actions more complex than those prior to merger. The distinctions inherent in this approach are based on a time when substantive law
was less developed and litigation less complex. There being no historical
analogue to the new actions, attempts to classify them according to historical,
now repudiated, distinctions must fail. The basic-nature-of-the-action approach is often defended by fictional reasoning based on waiver141 or a purported analogy to the premerger practice of granting legal relief in a suit in
equity when that relief was incidental to the equitable relief. 42- Similarly,
courts have selected one issue in the case and classified it as the "paramount
issue," the legal or equitable nature of which determined the nature of the
action as a whole, and hence, the right to a jury trial. 143 In addition to
reaching incorrect and historically unfounded results,14 4 this approach dero-

gates the spirit of reformed pleading. It presupposes a theory-of-the-pleading,
that is, determining the "nature" of the action from the prayer for relief, a

to whether the action, in its essence, is one at law or in equity. If it is at law, the
plaintiff is entitled to jury trial; otherwise he is not." Id. at 267.
140. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 354 (1963); Clark g-Wright, The Judicial Council and
the Rule Making Power-A Dissent and a Protest, 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 346 (1950); Joiner
K- Geddes, supra note 135; Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under Merged Procedures, 65
HARV. L. REV. 453 (1952).
141. The idea is that one waives one's right to a jury trial when, by joinder or
counterclaim, one interposes in an "equitable" action a claim that might have been
brought independently and tried to a jury. E.g., Morrissey v. Broomal, 37 Neb. 766, 56
N.W. 383 (1893); Mackellar v. Rogers, 109 N.Y. 468, 17 N.E. 350 (1888); Installment Bldg.
& Loan Co. v. Wentworth, 1 Wash. 467, 25 P. 298 (1890). The obvious drawback to this
doctrine is that it derogates from the code policy of encouraging the inclusion of as many
causes in one action as are convenient. If a joinder of claim or counterclaim is compulsory, such a holding would be untenable since it requires the destruction of a constitutional right as the penalty for asserting another legal right. Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d
546 (2d Cir. 1948).
142. This is a reference to the earlier chancery practice of granting relief ordinarily
available only at law. A court of equity would grant it in a case properly before it to
avoid putting a party to the expense of going to a new court to gain full relief, Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1945); C. LANGDELL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF
EQUITY JURISDICTION 67 (2d ed. 1908). However, such precedent is limited and, in any
case, with the necessity of beginning again having been eliminated by merger, it is not
clear why this practice, historically justified only to avoid a multiplicity of suits, should
be continued. In relation to the right to jury trial, it is an obvious fiction used to defeat that right where appropriately asserted. The courts characterize a suit as "equitable"
and treat the demanded legal relief as analogous to the merely "incidental" legal relief
that equity could always grant. This approach has been repudiated in the federal courts.
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Woods, 369 U.S. 470 (1962).
143. Mochsos v. Bayless, 126 Okla. 25, 258 P. 263 (1927); Carlisle Packing Co. v. Demming, 62 Wash. 455, 114 P. 172 (1911). Little need be said of the inappropriateness and
lack of historical foundation of such an approach.
144. It has been pointed out that this test is sure to expand or contract jury trial
rights in any case in which it is applied. McCoid, Jury Trial in Federal Courts, 45 IOWA L.
REV. 726, 727 (1960).
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practice repugnant to modem pleading. 4 5 This approach should be rejected
as untenable and undesirable.
Another approach to determining the right to jury trial classifies issues
as legal or equitable depending upon the desirability of jury trial in a given
action. Desirability is determined by such considerations as complexity
of issues and inherent capabilities of either judge or jury to deal with them. 48
If one accepts the desirability of retaining the right of jury trial as it existed
before merger, insofar as it is possible to do so, there can be no question
that this approach is less than desirable. It expands in some cases, and
contracts in others, the right to jury trial as it existed before merger. It is,
4
therefore, unlikely that courts will embrace it too enthusiastically.' 7
Another approach extends to all cases the right to jury trial. 48 For obvious reasons, this approach would be impractical and virtually impossible to
administer. The most widely accepted method of resolving the right-to-jurytrial problem in a merged system is to determine the equitable or legal
character of each issue of fact involved in an action and then to try it separately in the appropriate court. 49 This method gives effect to the liberal
joinder and counterclaim provisions of the new procedural codes, and, unlike some of the other suggested approaches, recognizes the necessity of
maintaining the right to jury trial as it existed prior to merger. Its major
shortcoming is that most issues of fact cannot, by themselves, be characterized
as either legal or equitable since an issue of fact usually could have arisen
historically either at law or in equity. 50 Various rationale have been formu-

145. See discussion at note 21 supra. A theory of the pleading approach, because it
would apply to all causes, would be unnecessarily broad and too all-encompassing. As noted
above, note 128 and accompanying text, the number of cases in which the jury trial problem
would be present is an exceedingly small percentage of total cases disposed of by our court
system. Pleadings should be simple narrative devices that serve merely to relate plaintiff's
complaint, give adequate notice to defendant and the court, and narrow the issues. To
bog down the pleadings by assigning to them the function of determining the right to
jury trial would be an undue burden in the great majority of cases. See Pike & Fischer,
Pleadings and Jury Rights in the New Federal Procedure,88 M1. PA. L. REv. 645 (1945).
146. Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under Merged Procedures, 65 H~Av. L. REv. 453
(1952).
147. See discussion at note 118 supra.
148. Van Hake, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C.L. Rsv. 157 (1952).
149. "Basic issues formerly triable as of right by a jury are still triable by a jury as
matter of right." Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 62, 65 (3d. Cir. 1943).
"Mhe basic nature of the issues must determine whether this be a 'jury action' and . . .
the nature of these basic issues must be determined." General Motors Corp. v. California
Research Corp., 9 F.R.D. 565, 567 (D. Del. 1949); see C.A~ux 53-54; 5 J. MooER, FEDERAL
PRACrIcn 238.16 (2d ed. 1965); Clark & Wright, The Judicial Council and the Rule Making
Power-A Dissent and a Protest, 1 SYRAcusE L. Rzv. 346 (1949); Note, The Effect of Law
and Equity on the Right of Jury Trial in Federal Courts, 36 Gao. L.J. 666 (1948).
150. As stated by McCaskill: "The right of jury trial.., attached to issues found in law
actions only, never to issues in an equity suit, and it is not true that the issues in a law
action were never the same as in an equity suit. On the contrary, any issue found in a
law action may also be found in an equity suit. Issues bearing on title to land . . . of
possession, of money due on promises, of damage due to property . . . are found in equity
suits as well as in law actions. Issues are colorless apart from the proceeding in which
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lated to overcome the lack of historical foundation of this "issue-oriented"
method; for example, the plaintiff chose his "preferred theory of the
1
"basic nature of the issue was determined by the
pleadings,""'
1 or the
52
judge.'
Neither rationale, however, overcomes the shortcoming stated by
McCaskill: that issues have neither an equitable nor legal nature apart from
the proceedings of which they are a part." 3 There having been no necessity
for separation of issues before merger, a method of solving the right-to-jurytrial problem based on such a separation necessarily alters this right.
Another approach is to extend to parties the same control over the jury
trial question that they exercised before merger. To the extent that one
party (plaintiff or defendant) would have had control over the question as it
arose in the various stages of litigation, his demand or opposition to jury
trial would be sustained. Thus the parties' positions on jury trial and the
relief sought would maintain the right to jury trial as it existed prior to
merger. 54 Aside from the involuntary waiver inherent in this approach'
and the havoc it wreaks on joinder of all claims in one action,ls6 it embraces
a fundamental shortcoming. It uses a premerger test to classify a form of
action that could not have existed before merger.
To show that a party could have achieved a desired result before merger
by maneuvering in a certain manner is significant only historically. What
in fact a party may now do is the only relevant consideration. The right
to jury trial should be determined solely on considerations of modern policy
as grounded in the constitutional guarantee. Recent federal cases bespeak
they are found .... They do not drift around in space, sole masters of their own destiny."
McCaskill, Jury Demands in the New Federal Procedure, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 318-19
(1940).
151. 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1138.17 (2d ed. 1965), which suggests that if plaintiff
pleads for equitable and legal relief in the alternative, his "preferred" remedy should
determine the nature of the issue and hence of the action. This is untenable. If the courts
require that when the appropriate remedy is in doubt, one must make a choice before any
proof is adduced in order to settle the problem of jury trial, then instead of destroying
the procedural barriers to joinder of equitable and legal claims the courts will be merely
resurrecting the barrier and giving it another name. Moreover, since the purpose of the
rules is to encourage (and by some views to compel) seeking of all claims in one suit, it
would seem unconstitutional to then require a plaintiff (or defendant in cases of a compulsory counterclaim) to forego either the reliance on both theories of the claim to right
to jury trial. Requirement that all claims be brought in one suit is sensible and just and,
since the "preferred theory" approach, if coupled with that requirement, leads to derogation of the constitutional right to jury trial, the latter theory should be repudiated. See
generally Morris, Jury Trial Under the Fusion of Law and Equity, 20 TEXAs L. REV. 427,
432 (1942).
152. General Motors Corp. v. California Research Corp., 9 F.R.D. 565 (D. Del. 1949).
153. McCaskill, supra note 150.
154. McCoid, Jury Trials in Federal Courts, 45 IOWA L. REV. 726 (1960).
155. A legal counterclaim, whether permissive or compulsory, to an equitable claim
would waive defendant's jury trial rights since before merger such a counterclaim, if
brought in equity, would be disposed of in equity either as incidental to the claim-in-chief
or by trying the equitable claim first to the court, and effectively foreclosing defendant's
jury trial on the legal issue. Florida has expressly rejected such an interpretation. Hightower
v. Bigoney, 156 So. 2d 501, 509 (Fla. 1963).
156. See discussion at note 57 supra.
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the conthe utter hopelessness of a strictly historical approach to effectuate
157
stitutional guarantee of trial by jury of legal issues of fact.'
A better rationale is suggested by consideration of three federal court
cases. Beacon Theatres,Inc. v. Westover 58 was an action in which both legal
and equitable claims were asserted. Their relationship was such that determination of the first factfinder would necessarily bind the later one. Therefore, if the issues were to be separately tried, the order of trial was very
important. The Court held that the legal claim should be tried first so that
it would not be precluded from jury determination. 59 In Dairy Queen, Inc.
v. Woods, 60 a plaintiff with a single claim sought both equitable and legal
remedies. The Court laid to rest the "basic nature of the issue" test by rejecting the argument that a basic equitable issue precludes the right to jury
trial on other legal issues. The Court stated: "Our previous decisions make
161
In
it plain that no such rule may be applied in the federal courts."'
62
Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, Co.,1 the Court held that when interdependent claims or remedies arise from a single set of facts, expediency and
practicality may require that they be tried by a single tribunal. It held
that since a jury must determine legal issues, the other equitable but interdependent issues must also be determined by a jury. Fitzgerald thus goes
beyond Beacon Theatre and Dairy Queen: not only must legal issues be
157. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963); Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
158. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
159. "Mhe trial court will necessarily have to use its discretion in deciding whether
the legal or equitable cause should be tried first. Since the right to jury trial is a constitutional one, however, while no similar requirement protects trials by the court, that discretion is very narrowly limited and must, wherever possible, be exercised to preserve jury
trial." Id. at 510. "In the federal courts this jury right cannot be dispensed with, except
by the assent of the parties entitled to it...."Id. at 511.
160. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
161. Id. at 470. The court further stated that the holding of Beacon Theatres, Inc.
i.e., that jury trial of legal issues may not be lost through prior determination of equitable
claims, "applies whether the trial judge chooses to characterize the legal issues presented as
'incidental' to equitable issues or not .

. .

. [W]here there cannot even be a contention

of such imperative circumstances, Beacon Theatres requires that any legal issues for which
a trial by jury is timely and properly demanded be submitted to a jury." Id. at 163.
162. 374 U.S. 16 (1963). The case was a suit brought by a seaman seeking damages
under the Jones Act (which requires a jury trial) and also for maintenance and care
(which, being cognizable in admiralty, does not require a jury). Plaintiff demanded a
jury for all the issues growing out of the single accident. The trial court judge granted
it as to the Jones Act claim but held the question of relief for maintenance and care to
try himself after the jury trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 306 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1962)
and the Supreme Court reversed, holding, inter alia that: "Requiring a seaman to split
up his lawsuit, submitting part of it to a jury and part to a judge, unduly complicates and
confuses a trial, creates difficulties in applying doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, and can easily result in too much or too little recovery .

. .

. In the absence

of some statutory or constitutional obstacle, an end should be put to such an unfortunate,
outdated, and wasteful manner of trying these cases. Fortunately there is no such obstacle
Only one trier of fact should be used for the trial of what is essentially one lawsuit
....
to settle one claim split conceptually into separate parts because of historical developments."
Id. at 18-21. The court further held that since a jury is required to try the Jones Act claim:
"Mhe jury .

..

is the only tribunal competent .

.
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tried first, but in certain circumstances, both equitable and legal issues must
be submitted to a jury.
The reasoning and results of these three cases adequately effectuate the
desirable policy strongly favoring resolution of all claims and defenses in one
suit. The cases provide the only method of maintaining the constitutional
guarantee of jury trial for legal issues and are in keeping with the stated
1 63
position of preference, which jury trial enjoys in Florida.
APPELLATE REVIEW

Before merger, the permissible scope of review of a trial court's findings
depended upon whether the action was tried in equity or at law. If in equity,
review was a reexamination of the entire record

-both

facts and law;164 if

at law, review was limited to consideration of alleged legal errors committed
by the trial court.16 5 Since the distinction between law courts and courts of
equity has been abolished,66 the proper scope of appellate review should be
redetermined. To maintain the scope of review as it was before merger would
be ill-advised. Preservation of the premerger distinctions between law and
equity for purposes of appellate review, after they have been abolished at
trial court level, would create needless confusion.
A reasonable alternative would have scope of appellate review depend
on the presence or absence of a jury in the proceeding below. The constitutional guarantee of jury trial for legal issues of fact is the only feature of a
legal action that, prior to merger, caused different treatment in appellate
courts.1

61

This guarantee still prevents appellate review of a jury's findings

of fact. When there is no jury, however, either because it is substantively
unwarranted 68 or because the parties waive it,169 differences of treatment
between legal actions and suits in equity are not merited. This is so because
determination of what formerly would have been a legal issue by a court

sitting without a jury is substantially the same as determination of a pre-

163. "Other cases could be cited in support of our thinking on the concept of trial by
jury and its place in our jurisprudence .... [I]t was at one time the right arm of common
law but . . . it is now the dividing line that separates law from equity and . . . it is

guaranteed by both the state and federal constitutions. It has had a long and distinguished
history and is now one of the main avenues through which the common man directs the
working of democracy." Hightower v. Bigoney, 156 So. 2d 501, 509 (Fla. 1963).
164. "[A]n appeal in a chancery cause opens the entire case for consideration by the
appellate courts," Jackson v. Jackson, 80 Fla. 557, 86 So. 510, 511 (1920); see Okeechobee
County v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 145 Fla. 496, 1 So. 2d 263 (1941); 5 C.J.S. Appeal and
Error §§1526, 1663-64 (1958).
165. Holstun v. Embry, 124 Fla. 554, 169 So. 400 (1936); Mellet v. Henry, 108 So. 2d
69 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959); Salter v. Knowles, 97 So. 2d 138 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
166. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.040.
167. U.S. CONST. amend. VII and FLA. CONSr. Decl. of Rights §3 were designed to preserve and guarantee right of trial by jury in proceedings at common law as known and
practiced at the time the Constitutions were adopted. Hawkins v. Rellim Inv. Co., 92 Fla.
784, 110 So. 350 (1926).
168. See jury trial discussion, notes 118-163 supra.
169. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.430.
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merger equitable issue. Scope of review for the two types of issues after
merger would, therefore, be the same. In cases tried by the court without
a jury, review of findings of fact and law would be permissible; but in cases
tried before a jury, there would only be review of alleged legal errors. In
neither case would scope of review depend on the legal or equitable character of the issues.
Complete uniformity in appellate review could be accomplished by permitting review of only alleged legal errors, whether the case was tried before
a jury or without one. Such a course would obviously curtail the scope of
review drastically and shield appellate courts from the necessity of reviewing
large trial records. This would be a considerable benefit in itself. Review of
only alleged legal errors in all cases, at first glance, appears to be a radical
departure from present practice. In fact, though, it is substantially in accord
with actual practice of Florida's appellate courts. Cases reveal that they
generally apply much the same review techniques to all cases - whether tried,
with or without a jury. 70
Simplicity and uniformity in appellate practice is desirable, and the
advantages of reducing the number of appeals and the complexities of records
in cases that are appealed are obvious. Moreover, accordance of due weight to
the findings of fact of those who actually heard the witnesses and weighed
their credibility would be practical and wise. Review of only alleged legal
errors in all cases would, therefore, be the most desirable scope of appellate
review.
CONCLUSION

The merger of law and equity in Florida should be a boon to practitioners.
Fully understood and employed, it should further simplify the procedural
obstacles that have often impeded a quick and just conclusion to litigation.
170. Courts will not review the weight of the evidence on appeal beyond ascertaining
the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment or decree, either in cases
tried to the jury, Holstun v. Embry, 124 Fla. 554, 169 So. 400 (1936), or in cases tried to
the court in chancery, Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 148 Fla. 473, 4 So. 2d 675 (1941).
Determination of questions of credibility and weight to be given evidence and testimony
presented is for the trier of facts, be it a jury or the court. Povia v. Melvin, 66 So. 2d 494
(Fla. 1953), Wilson v. Madox, 97 Fla. 489, 121 So. 805 (1929), which were tried to a jury,
and Peterson v. Hancock, 146 Fla. 410, 1 So. 2d 255 (1941), Joyner v. Bernard, 148 Fla. 649,
6 So. 2d 533 (1942), which were tried in chancery, support this same conclusion as do the
cases cited therein. The trier of facts, whether it be judge, jury, or chancellor must make
the decision as to which of the legally permissible inferences are to be drawn from the facts
adduced at trial, whether the case be tried at common law without a jury as in National
Sur. Corp. v. Windham, 74 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1954), or tried to a jury as in Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Gary, 57 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1952) and Palatka Abstract &Title Guar. Co. v. Haskell,
100 Fla. 134, 131 So. 394 (1930), or tried in chancery as in Helton v. Northern Cent. Trust
Co., 114 Fla. 796, 154 So. 328 (1934) and Sapp v. Warner, 105 Fla. 245, 141 So. 124 (1932).
These cases and the cases cited therein amply support the conclusion that regardless of the
availability of different modes of review in cases arising at common law or in chancery,
the Florida courts in fact apply the same scope of review in all cases, that scope being
limited to the alleged legal errors committed by the trier of facts.
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In the majority of cases, which lie wholly within the ambit of either equitable
or legal doctrine, no change in procedure or substance will result. In cases
that share characteristics of both equity and law, however, significant changes
should result. Obviously, there will be no need to file two sets of pleadings,
change courts, or, in the majority of cases, be concerned with the effect of
prior litigation on a case. In short, most of the complications resulting from
a dual court system have been eliminated. Problems still exist, however. The
most troublesome of these problems have been indicated in hope that by
forethought and provision for their occurrence members of the bench and
bar may avoid their destructive effect on a procedural system designed to be
expeditious and fair.
Pleadings, hopefully, will be further simplified and will remain unfettered
by the "theory of the pleadings" philosophy, which has plagued the effectiveness of merger in other jurisdictions. The burden placed on the trial judge
to determine the legal or equitable theory appropriate to the allegations may
be eased through the pretrial conference. Joinder of causes of action will be
essential to speedy and thorough resolution of controversies. To that end,
the present Florida rules governing permissive joinder may require revision
so as to be in accord with the spirit of merger. The problems posed by res
judicata under merger can best be solved on a case-by-case basis. This is so
because undue adherence to any abstract theory, based on trial convenience
or administrative economy, is bound to work hardship in individual cases.
The importance accorded jury trial in Florida and the public policy favoring
it should outweigh countervailing considerations of economy and efficiency.
The approach of recent federal court cases offers a convenient and easily
emulated solution to the right-to-jury-trial problem in most cases. The scope
of appellate review should be governed by simplicity and concern for uniformity of treatment of equitable and legal actions. These factors favor extension of "legal" review to all cases. In a merged jurisdiction in which more
complex cases are bound to arise, pretrial conferences should be utilized
frequently so as to minimize the chances of injustice caused by procedural
technicalities.
As an adjunct to Florida's substantive law, the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure should not be allowed to trap the unwary or be used as deceptive
devices of the trade specialist. The bench and the bar must be constantly
concerned with them, their shortcomings, and their possible improvement.
Only such concern will assure that they will remain mere aids in the speedy
and fair solution of conflict, rather than ends in themselves.

RICHARD V. FALCON
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